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IS THE U.S. NAVY BEING MARGINALIZED?

Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired)

A

ll who have gone down to the sea appreciate the various roles that seapower
plays in our nation’s defense. Going back to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s day, that
role was sea control—the ability to use the oceans to one’s advantage and to deny
the use of them to opponents. Shortly after Mahan, the first rudimentary projection of power ashore by amphibious assault was added. During World War II,
the projection of power ashore with aircraft and guns became another major
mission of navies; this has since expanded to include guided missiles. With the
advent of the nuclear age, navies also came to assure strategic nuclear retaliation
as the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. Today a new mission may be emerging,
that of defending the homeland or other land areas against attacks by missiles
through space.
Declining Missions
Setting aside homeland defense for the moment, the other four missions are today of lessening importance to our country’s security.

Strategic Deterrence. At the peak we had forty-one strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). We are now approaching eighteen and probably going to ten.
In part that is true because of the demise of the Soviet Union. It is also in part because we are beginning to recognize that the prime virtue of the SSBN, its invulnerability, has never been as important as many of us who have written on this
subject have contended. This change of mind results from a realization that the
threat of even only a few retaliatory nuclear detonations is sufficient to deter
anyone. That is because any would-be nuclear aggressor must assume the worst,
which is that we would retaliate by attacking his cities. Would the Russians or
even the Chinese, let alone ourselves, be willing to lose ten, or five, or even two
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major cities in the name of initiating and “winning” a nuclear war? Thus, even if
we had only the more vulnerable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
no SSBNs at all in our nuclear arsenal, we would still have an adequate strategic
deterrent. That would be the case even were some other nuclear power to acquire
many more nuclear weapons than we. No such power could assume that any preemptive first strike it undertook would be 100 percent successful—that is, that
there would be no nuclear retaliation. There would always be errors of targeting,
missiles that failed entirely, missiles that were inaccurate, and human errors in
execution. It all adds up to what Clausewitz described as “friction” in war. So a
U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent with only ICBMs should suffice. Thus, the
Navy’s role in this area is going to be looked at more critically, and this mission
of the Navy will be seen as less critical to the country than it once was.
Sea Control. Sea control is the most fundamental mission of the Navy, because
the country cannot thrive in peacetime without it and cannot fight overseas in
wartime in any sustained way without it—and no other military service can perform it. Today, though, there is no challenge to our control of the seas. The once
formidable sea-denial capabilities of the Soviet Navy have dried up. Starting
from the low point they are at today, it is unlikely they could be rebuilt in less
than two decades. The Chinese may have aspirations to challenge our use of the
seas in their region of the world, but they also are several decades from being
able to mount such a challenge. Smaller navies with diesel submarines, fast patrol craft, land-based aircraft, and land-based missiles may be able to make our
use of littoral waters more costly than we would like, but not to deny it to us. In
this atmosphere the Navy is going to have a difficult time obtaining funding for
sea control in the foreseeable future. It is also going to be difficult to motivate
personnel to train against a nonthreat.
Power Projection Ashore by Amphibious Assault. The last opposed amphibious
assault was made in 1950 at Inchon. We planned one at Wonsan in 1951 and another at Kuwait in 1991; both came a cropper due to mines. Today it is difficult to
imagine where the United States might want to conduct a major opposed amphibious assault in the next twenty years or so. China seems a possibility, but one
has to wonder if the United States would ever risk placing a major force ashore in
a country as vast as China and one with over a billion people, some three million
of whom are under arms. After fifty-two years of nonuse, the mission of major
amphibious assault is not going to draw a great deal of support or money. What
can be justified is the capability to put troops ashore in remote areas reasonably
quickly, either by helicopter assault or assault across a beach, in modest numbers
and against modest opposition.
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Power Projection Ashore by Bombardment. This is a mission of expanding capabilities. Guns already reach far inland and almost certainly can be made to go
very much farther; precision-guided missiles can be launched from submarines,
ships, aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. All except guns played a role in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. All will almost certainly have
roles to play in any future conflict. The Navy would do well today, though, to
take note that the U.S. Air Force dropped a majority of the munitions in Afghanistan, though it had to go halfway around the world to do it because there were
no good bases. In short, land-based airpower has demonstrated a very long
reach and quite short response times under very taxing circumstances. In contrast, naval airpower may find its response time lengthened. Today the Navy has
a fleet of about three hundred ships but is procuring only enough new ones each
year to sustain a fleet of about 180 to two hundred. If the Navy does drop down
that far, there will be insufficient ships to ensure that it can be quickly within
range of unexpected trouble spots around the world. If the Navy cannot get
there first, it will not be the instrument of first choice in such situations. Today,
though, there are areas where only the Navy can bring shorter-range, tactical
airpower to bear quickly, but the melding of long-range bombers with tactical
missiles is creating competition even here. Recent reports indicate there are
plans to upgrade the fleets of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers to reach targets almost
anywhere in the world. This is certainly not to say that naval air, missile, and gun
power will not be in demand for a long time to come. It is to say that the Navy’s
traditional advantages with these weapons are diminishing.
As noted earlier, the Navy may emerge into a mission of defense of land areas
through the interception of intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. It is far too
early to tell whether this mission will in fact mature or whether it will become
such a major one as to justify additional forces. With the fleet declining in size,
however, it would be difficult for the Navy to take on this additional mission.
An Altered Relevance
Why, though, with the exception of the possibility of missile defense, are the
Navy’s missions less relevant to national needs today than during the Cold War?
In part this is because advances in technology are making other systems more
competitive. In part it is because changes in the global environment have radically altered the need for military forces of all types. The relevance of the Army’s
heavy armored forces, for instance, has been questioned. In the 1991 Gulf War we
manhandled one of the largest tank forces in the world with hardly a scratch on
our own tanks. The Air Force, for its part, finds itself in a position with respect to
air superiority analogous to the Navy’s in regard to sea control—there just is not
much opposition today that can tangle with it in aerial combat. In short, all the
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military services are facing a need for “transformation,” to use the current jargon. If the Navy is to play the best role it can for our country it needs to examine
what transformation means for it, mission area by mission area.
Strategic Deterrence. We will not, and should not, forsake the submarine-based
deterrent entirely. It is psychologically important for the country to feel assured
that its strategic nuclear forces will never be so vulnerable as to endanger the
country. It is also prudent to err in the direction of safety when the consequences
of making a mistake could be so high. Also, should deterrence fail, we would
want to have a reasonable retaliatory capability available. Still, we also must recognize that the SSBN has several disadvantages. One is that the cost per deliverable warhead is high, and it will be especially so if we eventually succeed in
1
reducing nuclear arsenals to the low hundreds of warheads. We would not place
all those warheads in one SSBN, but it would be very expensive to maintain
SSBNs with only a handful of warheads on each. Also, if we do work our way
down to a low number of total warheads, numbers of warheads and their condition of readiness may well be controlled by an arms control treaty—we would be
anxious to know for certain what other people have, and they would want to
know what we have. It is difficult to count numbers and observe readiness in a
submarine hiding deep in the sea. In any case, however, we do not require more
than one or two SSBNs at sea with two hundred to four hundred warheads to intimidate any potential nuclear aggressor. In time we could reduce the cost of this
element of deterrence by replacing some of the ICBMs in our SSBNs with conventional cruise missiles and giving the submarines a dual mission. Alternatively, if each attack submarine carried one or two cruise missiles with nuclear
warheads, we would have plenty of assured deterrent out at sea at all times without having to dedicate SSBN platforms solely to that role.
Sea Control. As noted above, as far as the Navy’s sea control, the Army’s armored
warfare, and the Air Force’s air superiority are concerned, the traditional forms
of threat have all but disappeared and will not reemerge for the foreseeable future. Still, it would be foolhardy to expect these conditions to continue indefinitely. Since at least the battle of Salamis in 481 B.C., nations have attempted to
deprive other nations of the use of the seas. The issue for the Navy, then, is how
to sustain sufficient sea control capability to be able to deal with the possibility
of a revived threat of some sort to the use of the seas. One approach is simply to
resolve to retain some modest level of training and equipment against the traditional threats, despite the cost. That is easier said than done. For instance, in “Sea
Power 21,” the Chief of Naval Operations recently revised the wording of the
Navy’s missions, apparently to focus them more directly on impacting wars on
2
and over land. This new doctrine includes three new missions, “Sea Shield,”
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“Sea Strike,” and “Sea Basing.” Sea control may be subsumed within these three
new categories, but it is difficult to tell.
Perhaps the best way to deal with the sea control dilemma is a strong emphasis on discerning what the next threats may be and how to counter them. For instance, one near certainty is that traditional antisubmarine and antiair warfare
will not suffice to keep our ships afloat. One new threat to be countered is that of
terrorists attempting to drive our ships away from overseas deployments by harassing them whenever in port, as with the USS Cole. The development of a mobile defensive perimeter needs priority attention. Another potential threat is a
cruise missile, or even ICBM, launched from land and targeted at our larger
ships at sea by satellites. We will need far greater capabilities in antimissile defenses than we have today; bringing them into being should be a high priority
for research and development. Also, as part of better defensive capabilities, we
will likely want to move more of our cruise missile punch under the surface of
the seas—that is, into submarines. Analysis of the trade-offs in costs, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of surface ships and submarines for launching cruise
missiles in a future threat environment is a vital need. Still another concern must
be with our training and educational establishments, which must remind our
officers that the core mission of any navy will always be sea control, even if the
challenge is not great at a particular time.
Power Projection Ashore by Amphibious Assault. As the Navy shrinks, the amphibious force, with its rather limited mission, is bound to decrease in size,
probably substantially. The first units to go should be those having the primary
role of supporting major, division-scale assaults. For instance, large command
ships are not needed for smaller assaults, and the large staffs that go with them
could be trimmed down. The last amphibious units to go should be those capable of a second mission of projecting power ashore by bombardment. As we
come to rely increasingly on aircraft capable of vertical and short takeoffs and
landings, such as the Marine Corps’s V-22, and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver ordnance ashore, amphibious ships with small flight decks could operate as
small aircraft carriers. The Chief of Naval Operations recently indicated that the
Navy and Marine Corps are moving in this direction, creating “expeditionary
strike groups” from what have been amphibious ready groups. These groups will
be capable of littoral power projection by either assault or bombardment.
Ideally, this move is a precursor to making the Navy the fixed-wing tactical air
force of the Marines, with substantial savings over the present practice of maintaining two separate air establishments. Still another point to remember in the
transformation of projection forces is that mentioned earlier with respect to
amphibious assaults aborted because of mines. In those instances, mines were
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employed successfully by powers that—like our potential opponents today—
had negligible naval forces. Effective ways to detect and sweep mines have eluded
us for decades. It is time for a full-scale research effort to get on top of this
problem.
Power Projection Ashore by Bombardment. Sea Power 21 calls on the Navy to be
ready to strike at a moment’s notice anywhere. That is a tall order for a shrinking
fleet. There are four approaches to stretching the Navy’s resources for attacking
land targets: obtaining more funding, building less expensive ships and aircraft
but more of them, getting as much dual use as possible out of ships and aircraft
having other primary missions, and getting more punch out of existing forces
designed for the mission.
As for the first option, increased funding, it is difficult to forecast whether the
Navy’s budget will increase substantially. Many of us would have thought it improbable that military funding would stay as high as it has after the end of the
Cold War. Still, it would be not only problematic but even dangerous to bet on
sizable increases in the next decade.
The second option, less expensive but more numerous ships and aircraft, fits
well with the trends in both offensive and defensive military technologies. The
day of large aircraft carriers with large numbers of high-performance aircraft is
simply drawing to a close. Ninety percent of the munitions dropped on Afghanistan were precision guided, up from 10 percent in the Gulf War just a decade earlier. Remote sensors will see targets better than pilots can, and remotely
controlled precisions weapons will hit targets more accurately. In time more and
more of the precision weapons will be launched at long ranges from their targets, or from unmanned aerial vehicles, in order to minimize the exposure of pilots. With more accurate weapons, the ordnance-carrying capacity of the large
carrier will no longer be as important. On the defensive side of the technology
coin, we must recognize that technologies that make our forces more lethal will
be available in time to others. When opponents acquire remote sensing and precision, long-range targeting capabilities, as they are bound to do, the huge detection signature of the hundred thousand tons of steel in one of today’s aircraft
carriers will be a tremendous liability. It is argued that such liability is offset by
the defensive capabilities of larger ships. Those defensive systems (like directedenergy weapons) are themselves shrinking in size, however.
The third option of more dual use of ships and aircraft also fits with the
trends in technology. Small, less-vulnerable ships can carry much greater offensive punch than was possible just a few years ago. We need to distribute firepower: in expeditionary strike groups; in surface combatants and attack
submarines loaded heavily with land-attack missiles; in surface combatants with
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long-range, accurate guns; and in ballistic-missile submarines converted to conventional missile shooters. We should also revisit the concept of an Arsenal Ship
as an inexpensive way to put firepower to sea.
Just as the means of projecting naval power ashore by bombardment are
changing dramatically, the need for projecting naval power ashore is also changing dramatically. The requirement today is, and will be into the future, for quick
response with limited force more than for response with massive firepower. The
days of all-out “alpha strikes,” as in Vietnam, are behind us. Instead, as seen in
Iraq, we are turning to precision-guided attacks with modest amounts of munitions and modest numbers of aircraft. What we are likely to confront tomorrow
is the terrorist cell that is a target today but will be gone tomorrow; the rogue
state that is about to obtain weapons of mass destruction or already has and is
about to use them; the hostages who need to be rescued before they are taken
deep underground; the coup against, or invasion of, a friendly regime that must
be reversed before it becomes a fait accompli; or the need to respond to the use of
weapons of mass destruction by anyone against anyone.
The fourth option, doing more with what the Navy has, brings up the networkcentric concept of making information more universally available, thus optimizing the usefulness of the forces that can be brought to bear. The Navy has
been netting ships together for combat effectiveness for decades. The issue today
is to take maximum advantage of the ever-growing capabilities of information
technology.
The demand for transformation of the Navy is urgent, because of the pace of
both technological and geopolitical change. Military professionals are often accused of resisting change, and there is considerable evidence to support that
charge. Today it is vital to prove that adage wrong. Battleships dominated naval
warfare for about sixty years, and carriers for about the same. Our existing carriers will have plenty to do for the remainder of their operating lives, but a Navy
built around these ships will not carry us into the emerging era of warfare any
better than did the USS Arizona into World War II. To procure more large carriers today and expect them to be useful into midcentury is to be blind to reality.
Finally, today, much more than ever before, it is incumbent upon military
professionals to promote transformation. The nature of the military-industrial
complex, plus the breadth of congressional constituent interest in military procurement, bases, etc., will by themselves make forsaking the tried and true extremely difficult. Only if military professionals stand up and place the weight of
their expertise and prestige behind radical change will there be a change.
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1. See the author’s “The Dilemma of Nuclear
Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” Naval
War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001),
pp. 13–23.
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